In this dissertation we will focus on how the government mustered the largest possible support on a very risky issue. This was done by examining the political, economic and European background of Britain, which had a definitive influence on the government's decision. In the second half of this dissertation, we will analyze the official and unofficial aspects and results of its strategy on the single currency.
[...] This new hard-line stance caused a wave of indignation and disarray in the ranks of the large pro-European minority of the Conservative Party. If there has been (so far) only a small amount of resignations (D. Curry, Conservative agriculture spokesman, resigned from the shadow cabinet; I. Taylor resigned from a junior bench post; Temple-Morris decided to fight for euro within the Conservative Party after having threatened to defecting to Labour . this was only because the party leadership gave to the pro-Europeans the freedom of campaign and voting for the Single currency, in order to avoid a mass exodus by the pro-European members. [...]
[...] It's now time for the British Government to influence the solutions" (Amsterdam June 1997). And a few days later, at Noordwick, the British Prime Minister, pointed out that "launching a crusade for competitiveness and job flexibility" will be a priority of the British presidency of the European Union (January-June 1998). He added there that "job creating potential of the European Union economy means a flexible labour force that thrives on competitive, deregulated market, worker retraining and reformed Welfare State". This wish for economic leadership in Europe would however be completed only if the United Kingdom played a leading role in European economic policies, and especially in the EMU. [...]
[...] The government strategy has so far been pretty successful. Indeed, if this strategy has badly failed on its European attempt (but was the government not too ambitious the government was however quite successful in its attempts to put trouble in the Conservative Party, to benefit from the business community support and to reassure MNC. However, the most important stake of this strategy will be to convince the British people to adopt the euro. So, it will take some years to really evaluate if the Blair and Brown strategy had reached its most important goal. [...]
[...] Indeed, members of the Monetary Union will tighten their economic and political links for the common need of a Single currency. The setting up, no later than in May 1998, of the so-called 'Euro-X council' ( X stands for the future and still unknown (probably 11) number of participant to the EMU) is a good illustration of this foreseen loss of the United Kingdom influence in Europe. This new euro-council, born around the 12th and 13th October 1997 from the impetus of Bonn and Paris, will be made up of the finance ministers from the euro zone and will meet before the monthly gathering of the 15 European Union ministers (the actual 'Eco-fin'). [...]
[...] This feeling is backed by many British households which have benefited from a subsequent income increase dues to the economic upturn in the recent years ( cf. The Financial times, " British optimism spurs a growing economy", September 1. 1997) The business stance on the United Kingdom membership Like the British people, the business community is divided on the question of joining a Single currency. However, according to many polls, business and especially big companies seem to be pretty favourable to an early entry of the pound on the EMU. [...]
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