Qu'est ce qui justifie l'indépendance de la Banque centrale européenne?

Résumé du document

Since two years, we have observed a continuous devaluation of the Dollar vis a vis the Euro (-30% on this period). According economists, the Fed, by lowering its interest rates, has clearly made the choice to sustain the growth. The American industries and exporting companies have become more competitive while the households are encouraged to consume.

A question should be raised then, on which grounds is the independence of the Central Bank justified ?

The first section provides a brief historical background of the ECB and an introduction to the structure and governance of the ECB and ESCB and their main objectives, strategy and instruments. The second part of this essay analyses the grounds of the ECB's monetary principle of independence. In part three, I consider the issues of transparency, credibility and accountability...

Extraits

[...] The American industries and exporting companies have become more competitive while the households are encouraged to consume. A question should be raised then, on which grounds is the independence of the Central Bank justified ? The first section provides a brief historical background of the ECB and an introduction to the structure and governance of the ECB and ESCB and their main objectives, strategy and instruments. The second part of this essay analyses the grounds of the ECB's monetary principle of independence. [...]

[...] In other words, time-inconsistency leads to an inflation bias[20]. The Central Bank independence and price stability rules emerge as attempts to minimize the inflationary consequences of time inconsistency. However, the recurrent discussions have revealed strong differences on what the objectives of the Central Bank should be and how monetary policy should be conducted and not only between politicians on the one hand and central bankers and economists on the other. There is still a clear division of opinion between those who favour or have favoured through their central bank inflation targeting (such as the Bank of England) and those who prefer to operate through targets for monetary aggregates (such as the Bundesbank). [...]

[...] Furthermore, the degree of political independence depends on the formal responsibilities of the central bank. In this context, however, different interpretations are placed on the role of statutory requirement that the central bank pursues price stability. Independence is vital to the operational success of any central bank[9]. In line with the provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the Eurosystem enjoys full independence in performing its tasks : neither the ECB, nor the national central banks in the Eurosystem, nor any member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from any other body. [...]

[...] The independence of the ECB is thus fully respected. B The Grounds of the Independence Before considering the independence of the ESCB as set out in the Maastricht Treaty, it is worth looking briefly at the historical background. Significant changes have taken place in the thinking with regard to the role of monetary policy in the last two decades. There has been a growing recognition, perhaps stemming from the turbulent experience of the 1970s, that in the long term monetary policy can only systematically control the price level and not real economic variables such as output growth or unemployment. [...]

[...] The ECB publishes a consolidated weekly financial statement of the Eurosystem. This reflects the monetary and financial transactions of the Eurosystem during the preceding week. The ECB must publish reports on the activities of the ESCB at least once every quarter. It also has to draw up an Annual Report on these activities and on the monetary policy of the previous and current year and present it to the European Parliament, the EU Council, the European Commission and the European Council. [...]