Understanding the French 2003 Heat Wave Experience

Résumé du document

France does not commonly have very hot summers, particularly in the northern areas, but seven days with temperatures of more than 40 °C were recorded in Paris between July and August 2003. Because of the usually relatively mild summers, most people did not know how to react to very high temperatures (for instance, with respect to dehydration), and most single-family homes and residential facilities built in the last 50 years were not equipped with air conditioning. These reasons allow understanding why there were 14,802 heat-related deaths (mostly among the elderly) during the heat wave, according to the French National Institute of Health. But that shortcomings of the nation's health system raise the question why the administrations do not succeed to prevent such a death-toll ?
Firstly, we will see if there was a complete failure in the crisis management and then we will analyze what could be the causes of such a failure.

Extraits

[...] First of all, when do we consider that a heat wave represents a sanitary risk? Certainly high temperatures are one of the elements but it is also necessary to take into account the number of days of extreme heat, or the decrease or not of the temperatures at night. It seemed very difficult to define from which moment there was danger all the more that very low variations of these data or 2 degrees) could change radically the situation. Finally, as in any unexpected situation, the attention concerned first of all to the most visible aspect of the crisis, namely the hospitals which were overbooked. [...]

[...] Dr Pelloux (President of the trade union of hospital emergency services physicians) sent few messages but he didn't receive any answer. If he did not manage to spark of any reaction it's notably because these messages arrived at the central body in charge of hospitals instead of at the central body in charge of health. Compartmentalization of the administration. This malfunctioning also shows a total absence of communication between organizations as far as these two structures work in the same domain and occupy the same building. They didn't interact or exchange the data they received. [...]

[...] Unfortunately the situation worsened during the weekend and hospitals became rapidly overbooked. There was no more bed available, a lack of staff in the hospitals. Indeed a lot of staff and directors were on holidays and nobody was there to take decisions. Finally it's only the 14th August that the government decided to intervene by asking for a general mobilization in hospitals. The same day the temperatures started to decrease. So the emergency services of hospitals were the only to show a capacity of reactivity during the crisis. [...]

[...] Understanding the French 2003 Heat Wave Experience Introduction: France does not commonly have very hot summers, particularly in the northern areas, but seven days with temperatures of more than 40 were recorded in Paris between July and August 2003. Because of the usually relatively mild summers, most people did not know how to react to very high temperatures (for instance, with respect to rehydration), and most single- family homes and residential facilities built in the last 50 years were not equipped with air conditioning. [...]

[...] So we had a real denial of the government, which said that everything was under the control and that it was only about a political attempt of destabilization. Errors of communication But this strategy of the denial was not the only error of communication. Indeed, the heat wave is the perfect example of a crisis communication which was neither controlled nor adapted. The first public declaration came on Monday the 11th just after the peak of the crisis so it was already too late. [...]