Domestic politics on the international environmental political scene

Résumé du document

The environment represents a very particular area of international politics. As it constitutes a non-rival and a non-excludable good, this issue crosses the borders of all nation-states. The concerns regarding environmental damages affect all nations. Garrett Hardin, who developed the metaphor of the "Tragedy of the Commons", raises one of the most famous illustrations on this claim. In his article, he explains that a shared resource can be destroyed if everyone acts independently, pursuing selfishly his own interests. This reasoning can easily be applied to environmental issues. Negotiations between states are becoming more and more frequent on the international stage, as concerns are rising about the consequences of ozone depletion and climate change. Consequently, the debate around how to explain the developments of global environmental politics has led to the emergence of various theories or models. Some authors put forward the centrality of the states in the process of governance.

Extraits

[...] On the international stage, Bush argued that the Protocol was ‘unfair' and ‘ineffective', as it exempted 80 percent of the world, including China and India.[30] Finally, the bargaining model imagined by Ward, Grundig and Zordick also aims at explaining the changing process of international negotiations over climate change.[31] They elaborate a system that involves various mechanisms, among which: veto power, side-payments and bargaining behaviour with regards to ideal positions on the issue. Then, they apply the model to the Kyoto negotiations. They discern the leading actors from the veto players to evaluate the set of proposals that a ‘veto x' will not block, starting from the original statue quo position. From there, they study the influence of domestic politics on bargaining, such as the impact of lobbying or side-payments. [...]

[...] The ozone depletion is a clear example, because the impacts of the ozone hole are not necessarily affecting the biggest producers of the chlorofluorocarbons toxins (CFCs) but rather the countries that are most exposed to it. Thus, the global nature of the environmental issue can explain international outcomes. Doyle and Mcearchern have identified three kinds of environmental concerns that embody the need for an international response.[5] The first one is shared by a large number of countries across the world, like pollution or soil degradation. The second one refers to problems that may be concentrated in some countries, but which carry global implications. [...]

[...] Hugh Ward studied the effect of Game theory on environmental politics. He analysed the actors' behaviour from various assumptions and games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Chicken Game and Assurance Game, and determined their implication in the international environmental negotiations.[6] Plus, Franck Grundig emphasised the notion of relative gains in the global environmental cooperation, arguing that “cooperation is more likely for excludable goods than no excludable goods.”[7] He indeed explains that if a state is concerned with relative gains, cooperation will be more difficult to achieve because states will lack information about the other states' behaviour or interests, or because there will be too many asymmetries in cooperation between states. [...]

[...] php http://www.theozonehole.com/montreal.html http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2005/dec/08/greenpolitics.europeanunio n HARDIN Garrett, Tragedy of the Commons”, Science, Vol No December 1968, pp. 1243-1248 PATERSON Matthew, Understanding Global Environmental Politics: Domination, Accumulation, Resistance, MacMillan Press p 141 PATERSON Matthew, “Interpreting trends in global environment governance”, International Affairs No p794 DOYLE Timothy, MCEACHERN Doug, Environment and Politics, Routledge, Second Ed p 169 Ibid, p 170 WARD Hugh, “Game Theory and the Politics of Global Warming: the State of Play and Beyond”, Political Studies, Vol pp. 850-871 GRUNDIG Franck, “Patterns of International Cooperation and the Explanatory Power of Relative Gains: An Analysis of Cooperation on Global Climate Change, Ozone Depletion, and International Trade”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol p 782 Ibid, p 791 WARD Hugh, “Game Theory and the Politics of Global Warming: the State of Play and Beyond”, Political Studies, Vol p 850 & p 863 HEMPEL Lamont, Environmental Governance: the global challenge, Washington DC: Island Press p 6 PATERSON Matthew, “Interpreting trends in global environment governance”, International Affairs No p796 http://www.theozonehole.com/montreal.htm http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/joint_implementation/items/1674. [...]

[...] First, Ward highlights the notion of free riding in the international environmental relations. He says: an anarchic world system in which states are sovereign, national self interest seems to pressure many nation towards free riding.”[14] Indeed, on environmental issues, states are more tempted by the defection option rather than by the cooperation process, as Grundig suggested earlier with the prisoner's Dilemma. Moreover, we saw in the ozone regime that the United States has already taken some measures on banning non-essential use spray cans before the Montreal Protocol with the Clean Air Act in 1977. [...]