Racial discrimination in the administration of the death penalty

Résumé du document

On 21 September 2011, Troy Davis, a 42 year-old African-American man convicted of the murder of a policeman in Savannah in 1989, was executed after a lengthy judicial process punctuated by numerous graces and ultimately ill-fated appeals. Troy Davis' case spurred a worldwide mobilization against the death penalty and a media uproar, as the defendant was widely regarded by the media and a majority of the public opinion as most likely innocent.

This execution caused the issue of racial discrimination in the death penalty in the United States to be pushed yet again to the forefront. Retraction of 7 of the 9 witnesses, contradictions in witness accounts, lack of DNA evidence, as well as accounts of pressure by the police on witnesses, all pointed to a less than thorough administration of justice.

Many held the view that the death penalty had been sought against Davis not as a punishment to an offender whose guilt had been asserted and verified. Rather, it was sought in response to the absolute need to find someone to punish for the assassination of a law enforcement officer. In this regard, many observers noted that Troy Davis presented the profile of the ideal culprit , being both poor and African-American. Though it is now impossible to determine Davis' guilt, the strong suspicion this case elicited regarding racial bias in the judicial process is noteworthy.

Extraits

[...] [Avoid black women, because] they're downtrodden on two respects, they got two minorities, they're women and they're blacks. ( . ) You don't want all-white jury.” The prosecutor goes on to offer some edifying advice on how to avoid eliciting suspicion while still striking out Black jurors: “Count the blacks & whites in jury when they first walk in so you can keep track of how many are left as you strike them. Mark down reasons you can articulate for striking as you question them: [L]et's say the defense attorney makes an objection saying that you're striking blacks. [...]

[...] Dretke US Other case-law: - Wilson v. Beard, Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit, No. 04-2461, filed in October 2005. See statement by Robert Badinter on RTL, quoted in Anne Soetemondt, Sarah Leduc, “L'affaire Troy Davis,, symbole d'une justice en noir et France Septembre 2011, available at: http://www.france24.com/fr/20110921-affaire-troy-davis-peine-de-mort- justice-noir-blanc-discrimination-raciale-racisme-etats-unis-georgie-. Periodic Report of The United States of America to the U. N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Concerning the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, para September 2000; Scott Phillips, Racial disparities in capital punishment: blind justice requires a blindfold, October 2008, American Constitution Society for Law and Policy, page 4. [...]

[...] The combination most likely to lead to the death penalty being sought for the defendant is that of a white victim and a black defendant. There is thus statistical evidence of a racial bias operating in two ways: firstly, the death penalty is more likely to be sought against a black defendant than a white one; secondly, the judicial system punishes crimes against whites more harshly than it punishes crimes against black victims, since in proportion the death penalty is sought more often for the former than for the latter type of crimes. [...]

[...] general population was approximately 12 per cent Black; however, among those entering prison under a death sentence during this period (41 per cent) were Black. Of the 500 persons executed during these 22 years (36 per cent) were Black.”[2]. Moreover, by taking into account the seriousness of the crime each defendant was convicted for, one study conducted by Scott Phillips was able to identify a pattern of racial discrimination within data which, analyzed at first in raw percentages, showed no evident discrimination against black defendants. [...]

[...] The statistical data in question, on which the claim of discrimination would be founded, would be required to take into account mitigating factors not connected to race. Then, the burden of proof would shift to the State which would have to demonstrate that the statistical data can be explained by non-racial factors, such as the defendant's record or similar cases. In short, the Racial Justice Act would apply the same logic as the one applied to peremptory challenges in Batson, and as the approach used by the Civil Rights Act and its proof of disparate impact. [...]