What is distinctive about international human rights politics? - publié le 24/05/2013

Résumé du document

The States, which are the main actors in international politics, should never lead moral actions, if we take account of their rationality and egoism. Indeed, it is difficult to understand the incentives for states to act morally if we focus on the main theories of international relations. Actually, it is argued that what lead countries to behave in this irrational way (regarding the material costs) are domestic reasons. The defence of human rights is not something new (e.g. French declaration in 1789, fight to abolish slavery in the 19th century…) but it only became a universal recognized issue-area after the shocking tortures of WWII (Donnelly, 1986, p. 614). In the Declaration of Human Rights established by the United Nations in 1948, Human rights comprise different dimensions: “the right to be free from what are often called atrocities such as torture and genocide”, political and civil rights (including freedom of thought and speech) and even economic rights now seen as irrelevant (Gordon, 1997).

Then, agreements (Covenants in 1966, Rome Statute Agreed 1998) were ratified by many countries to improve the international mechanisms implemented to fight against the violations of such rights, although the enforcement system remains weak. Hence, this essay will show that the international human rights regime is very distinctive from the other regimes because it is based both on moral interdependence (rather than on material one) and domestic reasons (rather than the external environment).

The first part will demonstrate that individually, the States have sometimes incentives to undertake moral actions in spite of their material cost. It can be understood if we look at domestic reasons. Then, the second part will explain that the structure of the international human rights regime is thus very different from other regimes since it is a strong promotional regime which relies on moral interdependence.

Extraits

[...] The moral dimension can overtake the material one (contrary to trade international politics for instance). The two first differences focus on the individual behaviour of the State. If we aggregate these behaviours, we can understand why the structure of the international human rights regime is different (third reason). This regime is no based on interstate actions because human rights violations are national issues. Finally, what supports this system is the moral interdependence of the State, which does not make necessary more international binding legislation to compel the States. [...]

[...] Although this moral interdependence is relatively weak, one may argue that it can lead other countries to change their policies if they do not want to be blamed (kind of peer pressure). * * * To conclude, we can assert that international human rights politics are distinctive both in the ends and the means used by the states. The first reason is that the domestic situation of the States matters more than the external environment in explaining why the States undertake moral actions or not. [...]

[...] 700-720 and 763-791. - Kaufman, C. D. and Pape, R. A. (1999), ‘Explaining Costly International Moral Action: Britain's Sixty-Year Campaign against the Atlantic Slave Trade', in International Organization, No pp. 631-668. - Moravcsik, A. (2000), Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegations in Post-War Europe', in International Organization, No pp. 217-252. - Moravcsik, A. (2001), New Abolitionism: Why Does the US Practice the Death Penalty while Europe Does Not?' in European Studies Newsletter. [...]

[...] Other domestic aspects have to be taken into consideration. For instance, the culture of the country and public opinion may be important. According to Moravcsik, one of the reasons to explain the practice of the death penalty by the USA (compared to Europe) is the conservative opposition. The internal political organization (decentralization) is also a major factor in explaining such differences (Moravcsik, 2001). Finally, it is argued that moral action is more likely to emerge if it is “part of a program aimed mainly at domestic moral reform” (Kaufman and Pape, 1999). [...]

[...] 620) and is stronger than any other regional human rights regime. Finally, we can argue that the structure of this regime is very distinctive because it relies on “moral interdependence” (Donnelly p. 617) rather than on material interdependence. What is surprising about this regime is that most States generally adopt the human rights norms promoted by the UN even though there are not enforced to do it. No retaliation is necessary as in trade international politics for example (Donnelly, 1986). [...]