Does the 1998 Good Friday/Belfast Agreement, along with its subsequent development, provide the basis for a solution to the Northern Ireland problem, or is there in fact no solution to the Northern Ireland problem?

Résumé du document

"There has been no peace process so long in gestation as the one in Northern Ireland" (Cox, Guelke and Stephen, 2006:1). Northern Ireland has known three decades of violent conflicts in the twentieth century stuck between Nationalists hoping to achieve a united Ireland and Unionists whose desire to remain in the United Kingdom. In the wake of the ceasefire of the paramilitary organization on both sides and especially on the Irish Republican Army (IRA), an intense process of discussion between the governments and parties have taken place in 1997-1998, resulting in the Good Friday or Belfast Agreement on the 10th of April 1998, approved by a referendum in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland on the 22nd of May 1998. As Bill Clinton said, "the Good Friday Agreement represents the very best hope for lasting peace in Northern Ireland" (2000:3).

However, there has already been previously a succession of attempts to solve the Northern Ireland problem. How is the Agreement of 1998 different? Are the great hopes justified or is it just an inter-war period, a pause in violence as some may think? We will discuss here that the Agreement was certainly an unprecedented success in the peace process that it hasn't resolved the problem of Northern Ireland in itself. To do so, we will first take a look at the content of the Agreement and then look at the reasons for its success. Finally, we will examine its limits that left the Irish question unanswered.

Extraits

[...] Finally, the strategy of the Agreement can be associated to a “problem- oriented” approach which “ministers to conflict to conflict manifestations but rarely addresses the underlying, often structural, causes of conflict” (Ginty, Muldoon and Ferguson, 2007:2). The violence may have ended because of the accord between international elites, but what George Mitchell called the “decommissioning of mind-sets” is still unachieved, and “Northern Ireland remains mired in low levels of violence, sporadic civil disturbances, political intransigence, and public disaffection with an elite level peace accord.” (Ginty, Muldonn and Ferguson, 2007:2). As Coakley (2010:402) highlights, “mutual suspicion and political distrust between communities has been proven extraordinarily resilient in the Northern Ireland of the twenty-first century”. [...]

[...] According to Beggan (2002:340) “this system is a power sharing method that established an egalitarian government where the aspirations of the majority as well as the minority are adequately addressed and represented. The Agreement through consociationalism seems to have “provided sufficient stability and flexibility to allow a political process to take place in Northern Ireland that is regarded by the vast majority of the population as representative of its interests” (Wolff, 20011:63). If the Agreement was a necessary step in the peace process in Northern Ireland, it didn't, however, provides in itself a solution to it, because of inherent limits. [...]

[...] Finally, the Agreement dealt with human rights and the end of violence. Indeed, agreement acknowledged the divided nature of Northern Irish society, and the two governments committed themselves to respecting the equality of the two cultures” (Coakley, 2010:396). In order to do so, a Commission to promote human rights was created; the criminal justice system and the police force of Northern Ireland were to be renewed, so as to be acceptable by both communities. Regarding the end of violence, the agreement includes a provision on the decommissioning of all paramilitary weapons, which was of great symbolic importance. [...]

[...] Does the 1998 Good Friday/Belfast Agreement, along with its subsequent development, provide the basis for a solution to the Northern Ireland problem, or is there in fact no solution to the Northern Ireland problem? “There has been no peace process so long in gestation as the one in Northern Ireland” (Cox, Guelke and Stephen, 2006:1). Indeed, Northern Ireland has known three decades of violent conflicts in the twentieth century, stuck between Nationalists hoping to achieve a united Ireland and Unionists whose desire is to remain in the United Kingdom. [...]

[...] In 1998 the First Minister elected was David Trumble from the UUP and the Deputy First Minister was Seamus Mallon from the SDLP. where the largest party is given the first portfolio and each party then selects its preferred one as its turn arrives Except the IRA which broke temporally its ceasefire in 1996, but renewed it in 1997. The situation was promising though, since according to Wolff (2001:171) “ceasefires by the major paramilitary organizations did not cover a specified period of time, as they had in the past, but seemed, if not permanent, at least longer-term.” The Agreement won support of 94% of those voting in the Republic of Ireland and 71% in Northern Ireland” (Coakley, 2010:392). [...]