The Vanguard of Islamic Revolution by Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr

Résumé du document

Being an avid debater regarding Islamic revivalism and owing to incomplete consensus' regarding studies in the concerned subject, S.V.R. Nasr tries to cover the voids that have been left unattended. Furthermore, he establishes that Islamic revivalism is far from representing a monolithic unit by concentrating on the Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan and its particularity.

Extraits

[...] For the first time in its thirty years of history, the party became a part of the ruling establishment when Zia integrated the PNA in its regime. But the problem of democracy, for which the Jama'at-i Islami stands created tensions and Mawdudi, as well as Mian Tufayl after the former's death in September 1979, argued for the end of martial law and for new elections in this favourable situation for the Jama'at-i Islami. But Zia managed to manipulate the party so as to give him support - especially for the jihad in Afghanistan - and as the late elections of 1985 showed that its political luck was fading, he turned to other Islamic parties like the oulama's one or the Muslim League. [...]

[...] Social base In its beginnings in Pakistan, the Jama'at was essentially a Mujahir party, consisting for the most parts of Urdu-speaking migrants from India's Muslim minority provinces who settled in Sind an East Pakistan and migrants who moved to the Pakistani side of East Punjab. The social work organised by the party to help the Mujahirs during and after partition in deed created a long-lasting bond between them. Until the creation of the MQM (Mujahir Qaumi Mahaz) it was the most visible support of the Jama'at. [...]

[...] The action was mainly base on propaganda, but the quest for power in Pakistan made some leaders think, and among them Mawdudi, that a next plan of action should be elaborated, as well as more direct political involvement. But the defeat during the Punjab elections of 1951 reinforced the struggle between the two opposite visions inside the party. Since 1947, the expansion and rationalisation of Pakistan had created a powerful bureaucracy that supported some of Mawdudi's rivals. This opposition led to the Machchi Goth affair 1955-1957 that eventually reinforced Mawdudi's power and was the reason for an important purge. Also reoriented it the Jama'at-i Islami towards politics. [...]

[...] Up to now, the Jama'at has been a party of contradictions, may it be on its social base, its commitment to both Islam and politics or its relation with the ruling power. Since Islamic revolution in the party's rhetoric is not the battle cry for the masses but an elitist crusade, it has failed to mobilize the masses for collective action. This certainly represents one of the reasons why the Jama'at-i Islami never came to power in Pakistan, though it deeply influenced the country's politics and the role of Islam. [...]

[...] The military coup organised by Iskadar Mirza and Muhammad Ayub Khan quickly set an end to this Islamic constitution in 1958 and created a secular state. This led to division between a Westernised and secular ruling class and a more traditional mass of people, a gap that represented a danger for Pakistan. Meanwhile still driven by both Islamic and democratic values, the Jama'at-i Islami continued its campaign against the secular politics that tried to squeeze out Islamic parties. But the Combined Opposition Parties, a coalition including the Jama'at, failed, one reason being the fact that their presidential candidate was a women, Fatimah Jinnah. [...]