Contemporary theories of Justice- Essay : is the principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity (FEO) defensible?

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The principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity (FEO) is a part of Rawls' theory of justice, detailed in his Theory of Justice (1971) . This principle emerges from Rawl's distinction of the classical liberal of ?careers open to talents' -or "formal equality of opportunity?- from a more substantive idea, the FEO principle, which requires that citizens with the same talents and willingness to use them have the same educational and economic opportunities regardless of whether they were born rich or poor. "In all parts of society there are to be roughly the same prospects of culture and achievement for those similarly motivated and endowed.? As a part of the whole Rawlsian theory of justice or as an independent principle, and as a one among others form of equal opportunity or as a really innovative and original ideal of justice, the FEO principle has been the target for a number of critics.

Extraits

[...] That is why it seems to Richards that the problem of identifying a standard for equality of opportunity is that it cannot be reduced as a single issue. Considering each kind of standard induvidually, however, is wrong too, insofar as none of them, without any relations with the two others, can be counted as concerned with equality of opportunity.[8] The consequence of all this is that the ‘term [of equality of opportunity] should just be dropped', and the term can be prevented from doing any moral work, the way will at least be open for the real moral work to be done'. [...]

[...] Mason (ed.) Ideals of Equality, p53 Richards, J., ‘Equality of Opportunity' in A. Mason (ed.) Ideals of Equality, p76 Arneson, Richard, "Equality of Opportunity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2002 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) Freeman, S., Rawls p89 Arneson, R., ‘Against Rawlsian Equality of Opportunity', Philosophical Studies Vol See Arneson, Richard, "Equality of Opportunity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2002 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) Freeman, S., Rawls, p96 TJ, p74 Freeman, S., Rawls, p97 Barry, B., 'Equal Opportunity and Moral Arbitrariness' in N. [...]

[...] Contemporary theories of Justice- Essay : is the principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity (FEO) defensible? The principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity (FEO) is a part of Rawls' theory of justice, detailed in his Theory of Justice (1971)[1]. This principle emerges from Rawl's distinction of the classical liberal of ‘careers open to talents' -or “formal equality of opportunity”- from a more substantive idea, the FEO principle, which requires that citizens with the same talents and willingness to use them have the same educational and economic opportunities regardless of whether they were born rich or poor. [...]

[...] It is true that, assuming that FEO is required for equally talented people, Rawls do not try to reduce inequalities of opportunity between differently talented people. The FEO principle is, however, an exacting principle of equal opportunities. Indeed, it assumes the elimination of every kind of discriminations between, and it entails the implement of a free, compulsory and efficient school system.[18] As for the objection against rawlsian equality of opportunity concerning family, and the scope of FEO, it finds a reply in Freeman and Mason essays. Fair equality of opportunity is made imperfectly realisable by the existence of family. [...]

[...] Indeed, other kinds of contingencies can affect the opportunities of those similarly endowed (such as friendships). Thus, even though Rawls accepts that is impossible in practice to secure equal chances of achievement for those similarly endowed, he does not see any reason to drop the FEO principle, and just proposes to ‘limit the understanding of what FEO involves'[20]. Several other reasons lead us to think that FEO is a requirement of justice. FEO is a part of the ideal of equal status of free and equal citizens, and is one of the social bases of self respect, insofar as the exclusion from social positions on discriminatory grounds is an affront to person's dignity. [...]