“Whatsoever is, is in god, and nothing can or be conceived without god.” – Spinoza, Ethics. Discuss

Résumé du document

This one surely counts among the boldest expressions of Spinoza's pantheistic system in the Ethics ; and even though that system is well-known primarily for its radicality, we should make sure some further analysis is given which explicates it well enough, before we can even start discussing it seriously. What does Spinoza exactly mean by this – how does this kind of pantheism work?

This – rather strong, indeed – metaphysical claim appears as the fifteenth proposition in the first part of the Ethics ; as such, it is supposed to flow from a relatively small number of definitions and previous theorems. The argument goes as follows : (i) there can be only one substance, namely, God ; (ii) therefore, every particular thing must be a mode of this substance ; (iii) modes, by definition, are to be conceived through that thing in which they inhere ; (iv) therefore, ‘whatsoever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God'.

It seems valid ; is it sound ? We shall analyze every premise separately ; however, it should appear to everyone that (i) requires special attention, for it bears the most important and difficult part of the justificatory task : (ii) is only an immediate corollary of this first premise1, and (iii) merely expresses a relatively typical definition in modern philosophy. As we shall see, only with (i) does Spinoza introduce a very peculiar feature of his philosophy ; that is why its analysis is bound to be a crucial test for the whole argument, while (ii) and (iii) require, as it were, only some further clarification, regarding the traditional views in metaphysics at Spinoza's time.

Extraits

[...] Morgan ; trad. S. Shirley), Hackett (2006) ; - Spinoza, B., Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect in The Essential Spinoza (ed. M. L. Morgan ; trad. S. [...]

[...] (1721 words, according to MSWord word count tool.) bibliography - Bennett, J., ‘Spinoza's Metaphysics' in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, Cambridge University Press (2006) ; - Curley, E. M., Spinoza's Metaphysics : An Essay in Interpretation, Harvard University Press (1969) ; - Saw, R. L., The Vindication of Metaphysics : A Study in the Philosophy of Spinoza, MacMillan (1951) ; - Schmidt, A., ‘Substance Monism and Identity Theory in Spinoza' in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, Cambridge University Press (1996) ; - Spinoza, B., Ethique (ed. and trad. C. Appuhn), Vrin (1977) ; - Spinoza, B., Ethics in The Essential Spinoza (ed. [...]

[...] To put it another way : Spinoza here demonstrates that all subjects (as contrasted with objects) of thinking are in God as modes, is such a way that no thinking could be done without God22. Ultimately, anyone must be able to see that, though the Aristotelian tradition in metaphysics, on which it relies, has lost much of its power for us, Berkeley's case is highly consistent, and that it should not be dismissed too quickly, following the sole criterion of intuitiveness ; fixed and completed by interpreters (such as Bennett) in a sheer Spinozistic way, it provides a very powerful tool for analyses of beings and actions in the world. [...]

[...] ‘Whatsoever is, is in God' because God is the only substance, in which everything inheres as a property : attributes in themselves are the infinite properties under the guise of which substance is said to be perceived14, and modes are spatially and temporally delimited changes in the (wholly unchanging) substance15. Everyone should now be able to understand Viljanen's comment ; that is, everyone should see that, if obtains, and if we accept to construe our ontological system with the traditional epistemological categories of substance, attribute and mode (and there seems to be no absolute reason not to do Spinoza's pantheistic conclusions follow logically. [...]

[...] M. L. Morgan ; trad. S. Shirley), Hackett (2006) ; - Spinoza, B., Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being in The Essential Spinoza (ed. M. L. [...]