The logic of appropriateness – John G. March and Johan P. Olsen

Résumé du document

In the first place, the authors define what a rule of appropriateness is. It is a rule defined by what is considered an exemplary behavior, and then seen as natural and legitimate. They first expose the basics about the rule-based action. According to them, this is an ancient concept, theorized for example by Sophocle in its version of Antigone. They describe the cognitive process necessary to establish rules. The point actually is that such rules can be internalized by the people in three different ways: the reaction to a problem by analogy to past situation (experience), the action according to our social role and the action according to our identity. Therefore, rule-based action is not always strictly rational but based on internally institutionalized mechanisms.

In a second part, the authors move on to the democratic institutions. They describe the institutions as a series of rules embedded in a concrete structure of resources in order to make action possible. Their description of the institutional mechanisms is actually very complex and hardly understandable. They try to understand how some rules may affect the behavior of such institutions. According to them, it is important to study the impact of numerous factors besides the rule itself to understand the impact of rules upon action, such as the interpretation of the rule for example.

Extraits

[...] Although the fact that they may make some actions more likely than other, they do not allow a full understanding of the political behavior. Therefore, it is important to understand that actions cannot be only understood by rules; rules are only providing a frame for further action, but do not determine it precisely. Rules undoubtedly benefit the organization of policy-making, but its efficiency requires flexibility. They however are necessary to the cohesion of a democratic society, as they help to cope with the diversity in its midst. In a third part, the authors focus on the dynamic of the rules of appropriateness. [...]

[...] They first show the existence of different logic of actions through the example of democratic actors which may on the first hand act in a Machiavelian way (i.e. acting inappropriately but obtaining good consequences (consequentialism)) or follow the rules at the cost of possible better outcomes. He demonstrates that the consequentialist logic became more and more popular amongst the great democracies. Nonetheless, the rule of appropriateness is not outdated, as the example of the European Union shows it. The authors finally assume a hierarchy between the rules of action. References John G. March and Johan P. [...]

[...] The logic of appropriateness John G. March and Johan P. Olsen In the first place, the authors define what a rule of appropriateness is. It is a rule defined by what is considered an exemplary behavior, and then seen as natural and legitimate. They first expose the basics about the rule- based action. According to them, this is an ancient concept, theorized for example by Sophocle in its version of Antigone. They describe the cognitive process necessary to establish rules. [...]

[...] They wonder why and how the perception of appropriateness may change. Such rules are expected to evolve with our perception, our values, due to the new experience that we may come across. The authors however argue that our capacity to modify our rules on the basis of experience is limited. According to them, if some rules may change in a very fast way, the basic set of rules will evolve much slower, despite new experiences. This can be explained by the fact that such ground rules embody a common past, and the common values going with it. [...]