What are the differences between Locke's and Hobbes's notions of the state of nature? Discuss with reference to the Second Treatise of Government and the Leviathan

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As two of the fundamental social contract theorists, Hobbes and Locke are very often opposed, on prima facia readings ; for the former appears as a true defender of authoritarianism, with all its possible derives, while the latter supports a genuinely liberal idea of limited government. However, though this view is generally true, it is misleading, for it fails to give real access the most basic elements by which each of them gets to his final conviction, and (it is sometimes argued) exaggerates the distance between their doctrines. To understand the true respective meanings of Hobbes's and Locke's political theories thus requires to perceive the most fundamental differences in their views of the natural condition of man – that is, as both of them put it, of the condition of man in the state of nature. We shall then try to show, from the baldest acknowledgment of those differences in their pictures of the state of nature, how they relate to some most precise differences in their pictures of man as such, in that state.

At the most general level, the differences arising from the comparison of the Hobbesian and the Lockean notions of the state of nature are striking : while Locke defines ‘his' state of nature as ‘a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and preservation'3, Hobbes speaks of his as a condition of ‘continuall feare, and danger of violent death' in which ‘the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short'.

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[...] At the most general level, the differences arising from the comparison of the Hobbesian and the Lockean notions of the state of nature are striking : while Locke defines ‘his' state of nature as state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and preservation'3, Hobbes speaks of his as a condition of ‘continuall feare, and danger of violent death' in which life of man solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short'4. In such different contexts, obviously, the natural fulfillment of man (that is : before any political power has a role to play) cannot attain the same degree : Locke's picture of the state of nature includes some developments, to a certain extent, of economics, with property, agrarian labour, and even money this point in particular obviously needs to be discussed later whereas Hobbes's leaves no place to ‘industry' or ‘culture of the earth'. [...]

[...] Much has been said about Hobbes's ‘homo homini lupus', so as to justify his pessimist view of the state of nature : though it is incorrect as such, it is true that any answer is to seek in both authors' conception of man psychology. Hobbes' indeed wants to keep the emphasis on the crucial matters of security and self-preservation ; but Locke no less recognizes it as a central issue, and ultimately the main reason to call for political power8 : the distinction lies elsewhere. [...]

[...] And eventually, the same law and the same right justify lawful punishment, as one who ‘offended against the common law of nature' by spoiling products is said to be ‘liable to be punished'27. One can then measure of far from Hobbes Locke was led by the mere introduction of this moral element : for there is no such thing as natural ‘injustice' or lawfulness in the Hobbesian theory, following which every punishment is a prerogative of the political sovereign28. As Von Leyden (1981) makes it clear, this difference expresses the more general distinction between Hobbes's and Locke's notion of natural law and its functioning : The contrast between the two theories lies in Locke's statement that each man in the natural state is judge with regard to the law of nature, whereas Hobbes asserts that everybody in that state is judge with regard to his own self-interest and the justness of his fears.29 That is, even if, ultimately, the Lockean right to lawfully punish others has its (natural) origins in the individual self-preservation30, the law of nature endows it with a normative title of ‘higher morality' that cannot exist in Hobbes positivistic view : in saying that has the right to lawfully punish others', the meaning of ‘having the right' cannot be merely understood as ‘having the power' which amounts to no more than the Hobbesian version of amoral violence, in which case the precision added by the adverb ‘lawfully' would seem rather absurd. [...]

[...] 191- Rapaczynski, A., ibid., p This should seem rather obvious, thus, that the laws of nature cannot be moral rules, for they are explicitly derived from natural right, which is strictly amoral (as Rapaczynski puts it : it is equivalent to power.) 17. ibid., pp. 89-90 : such beliefs can be, in the case of natural law, religious beliefs in the existence of a retributive system in the afterlife, or in the case of contract, beliefs in the overwhelming force of one's opponent Macpherson, C. B., Introduction to the Second Treatise of Government in Locke, J., op. [...]

[...] What are the differences between Locke's and Hobbes's notions of the state of nature? Discuss with reference to the Second Treatise of Government and the Leviathan As two of the fundamental social contract theorists, Hobbes and Locke are very often opposed, on prima facia readings ; for the former appears as a true defender of authoritarianism, with all its possible derives, while the latter supports a genuinely liberal idea of limited government. However, though this view is generally true, it is misleading, for it fails to give real access the most basic elements by which each of them gets to his final conviction1, and (it is sometimes argued) exaggerates the distance between their doctrines2. [...]