But neither does everyone openly advocate disobedience (Smith) Disobedience, that is defined by convention as an illegal non-violent action undertaken on grounds of moral principles (Singer), seems to be only justified when there is no independent moral reason to obey or when the weight of independent moral reason favour disobedience. Few philosophers, however, think that conditions could be achieved in a reasonably just society, such as in a democracy. But as M.L.King stressed it "we should never forget that everything Adolf Hitler did in Germany was "legal" and everything the Hungarian freedom fighters did in Hungary was "illegal"". Civil responsible citizens, under some conditions and some circumstances, may be obliged to act in conformity with their conscience and overridden the prima facie duty to obey the law. Sometimes, civil disobedience may be a necessary evil to protect the democracy and its values.
[...] SOURCES Tebbit, M., Philosophy of law, an Introduction, Ch.5 Harris, J.W, Legal Philosophies, Ch.16 Dworkin, R., not prosecuting civil disobedience”, in Kipnis, K. Philosophical issues in law. Bix, B., Jurisprudence: Theory and context, Ch.16 Suber, P., Philosophy of law: an Encyclopaedia, in Gray, C.B. on www.earlham.edu/-peters/writing/civ-dis Smith, M.B.E, duty to obey the in Companion to the Philosophy of Law and legal theory, in Patterson, D. [...]
[...] Dworkin, however, believed that there is no evidence that civil disobedience leads to an increase in lawlessness. If Rawls is right to circumscribe the situations in which civil disobedience is justified, his view may be too narrow. I believe that all civil disobediences, that are aimed at defending the democratic and humanitarian values that are thought to be fundamental for one's conscience, justified civil disobedience, such as unjust wars or environmental dangers. We always have a right to resist iniquitous law or policy. Majority does not make rights. [...]
[...] Dworkin believed in the existence of a prima facie duty to obey the law. He recognised, however, that a man has other duties than those he owes to the state such as to god or his own conscience. When the law invades a man's right, there is a right to disobey it. This right to disobey is a feature of its rights and cannot be denied without denying there are any rights at all (home.clara.net). Moreover, Raz, in The authority of the Law, in 1979, argued that the general obligation to obey the law gives rise to the danger of an uncritical assumption of authority. [...]
[...] Can it be justified against the arguments for a prima facie duty to obey the law in a democracy ? claim authority is to claim the right to be obeyed” (Wolff). Legitimate authorities are given a right to rule, correlatively the citizens owe a duty to obey the law of the land. There exits a prima facie obligation, that is the moral obligation to obey the law, especially in a democracy, where citizens are bound by their social contract to accept the majority rule, and hence to obey the law (Singer). [...]
[...] They fear as A.M Honoré did in his book Making Law bind, in 1987, that a breach in the law is wrong because it may lead to attitude of disobedience”, which may breakdown the order and the cooperation needed for a society to function (Bix). According to those different theories, civil disobedience may not be justified, since its application would threatened the existence of the democracy. Yet, sometimes the democracy needs civil disobedience. In a democratic regime, the citizens give their elective leaders the power of enforcing the law. [...]
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