To what extent are values and colours anologuous ?

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It can seem quite strange at first, to compare moral values and colours, for one consideres one of these two things to be acquired, as the other one seems to be in constant evolution. Blue, green or red, can be defind in nature, but goodness, cruelty or rightness are simple human qualifications made upon a precise and determined action or statement. For example, there is no feeling of cruelty when an animal eats another one, it obeys to what we call the 'law of nature', based on survival and on the logical cycle of the one animal which eats another one, ends up being finally eaten by a third animal. In nature, there are no moral values, or no feeling of morality, it is indeed a human concept, who determines the path of a society in its rightness or falsity. Both colours and moral values look like they are following a different manner to be learned and taught, what looks red will look red to an entire group of people, however what sounds good will not sound good to the exact same set of people. That is the first draft, the first thought that we encounter when we meet the subject's assertation, to see how colours and values cannot be anologuous.

Extraits

[...] Colours are valuable things because they created inside us some feelings, they do exist in nature because we see them in nature, colour is colourless in the reality of the universe. They bring to life emotions that have a logic because of a human interpretation of them, for exemple red is the color of passion and white of purity. This brings us back to the question of objectivity, is it a real issue ? Or do we perceive values as we perceive colors, do they have a meaning just because we give them a human interpretation ? [...]

[...] His thesis is based on negation for exemple the negation of linguistic, is an action really good because it is said so ? What does the word good really stands for ? Such questions are more factual than conceptual. This is why Mackie makes an analogy with colours, following Locke's pattern, who described objects' properties into two categories, primary qualities and secondary qualities. Lets take the exemple of a table, its primary qualities are its shape, its size, its place in space, its solidity, but its secondary qualities are for exemple its colour, going against mathematical or physical statements. [...]

[...] Ethic is not objective say Mackie and Hare, it is only a matter of moral values to one's system and rules. In this case we can speak about a disagreement, and if the two views are correct then this disagreement is its appearance only, because both views have their own system of morality. This brings us to the main root of european philosophy, which is greek, carried through out the centuries by writers like Plato. For the greeks, ideas were universal, and the concept of beauty, goodness and justice was an ideal giving balance to the cosmos. [...]

[...] That is the first draft, the first thought that we enconter when we meet the subject's assertation, uncapable to see how colours and values could be anologuous. The main issue of this sentence is based upon subjectivity, as opposed to objectivity, if this constat really exist, saying that colors are objective and moral values are not. For some philosophers like Locke or Mackie, both of these two philosophical objects are analoguous, one shining on the other one to explain it. [...]

[...] To what extent are values and colours anologuous ? Jean-Baptiste Buffet To what extent are values and colours anologuous ? It can seem quite strange in first place to compare moral values and colours, for one consideres one of these two things to be acquired, as the other one seems to be in a constant evolution. Blue, green or red, can be find in nature, but goodness, cruaulty or rightness are simple human qualifications made upon a precise and determined action or statement. [...]