To what extent are values and colours analogous?

Résumé du document

It can seem quite strange to compare moral values and color, for one consideres one of these two things to be acquired, as the other one seems to be in constant evolution. Blue, green or red, can be defind by nature, but goodness, cruelty or rightness are simple human qualifications made upon precise and determined actions or statements. For example, there is no feeling of cruelty when an animal eats another one, it obeys what we call, the 'law of nature', based on survival, and on the logical cycle that the animal which eats another one, ends up being finally eaten by a third animal. In nature, there are no moral values, it is a human concept. Both color, and moral values look like they are following a different manner, to be learned and taught, what looks red will look red to an entire group of people; however what sounds good will not sound good to the exact same set of people. That is, the first draft, the first thought that we encounter when we examine the subject's assertation, that it is impossible to see how colors and values could be analogous.

Extraits

[...] What Mackie shows is that both values and their real applications can differ. In order to explain that point he refers to justice, and brings into light the difference between written laws and concrete judgments. Judges are not like objective laws; the best example is perhaps all unfair judgments given by racist judges. Moral values are here totally subjective; they only have a meaning because of a determined life and experiences. Here we see that standards of values are opposed to their applications, differing from each other because of a personal, human, interpretation. [...]

[...] Such questions are more factual than conceptual. This is why Mackie makes an analogy with colours, following Locke's pattern, who described objects' properties into two categories, primary qualities and secondary qualities. Let's take the example of a table, its primary qualities are its shape, its size, its place in space, its solidity, but its secondary qualities are for example its colour, going against mathematical or physical statements. Locke shows that theory is the same everywhere, but sensations can vary, with for example the evolution of senses, primary qualities do not change, secondary can. [...]

[...] In this case we can speak about a disagreement, and if the two views are correct then this disagreement is its appearance only, because both views have their own system of morality. This brings us to the main root of European philosophy, which is Greek, carried through out the centuries by writers like Plato. For the Greeks, ideas were universal, and the concept of beauty, goodness and justice was an ideal giving balance to the cosmos. Moral values were objective, and access to them was not a simple thing, it was a long process of elevation. [...]

[...] To what extent are values and colours analogous? It can seem quite strange in first place to compare moral values and colours, for one consideres one of these two things to be acquired, as the other one seems to be in a constant evolution. Blue, green or red, can be find in nature, but goodness, cruelty or rightness are simple human qualifications made upon a precise and determined action or statement. For example there is no feeling of cruelty when an animal eats another one, it obeys to what we call the of nature”, based on survival and on the logical cycle of the one who eats another one to end up being finally eaten by a third animal. [...]

[...] In conclusion, we can say that moral values and colours seem at first strike quite different, but that they follow the same pattern. They seem to exist despite us, existing all around us, that is why anybody could distinguish good from bad, saying by this that both are part of the fabric of a society. However, colours are alike values, they do not exist naturally, they cannot be find in nature, no animals wood be fair or good to another one, and red, blue or green have no signification in the emptiness of space. [...]