Does Rawl's account of the original position imply any theory of the person, or of personal identity?

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Rawls account of the 'original position' is subject to many criticisms from communitarian philosophers. While this account constitutes the very basis from which he derives his theory of justice, it is regarded as being flawed and thus compromises the validity of his whole theory. The criticism focuses on the fact that the concept of the original position implies a theory of person, which is, according to the communitarians, a wrong account of human experience. According to them, it namely neglects the extent to which self is constituted by the social world in which one lives and from which one derives its conception of the good, and of how to live in society. This criticism can be a powerful one, since it is able to undermine Rawls's entire theory. Thus, the claim that the original position entails a theory of person is to be examined closely. This debate is moreover crucial within political philosophy, as it constitutes the central focus of the communitarian critics on Rawls's Theory of Justice. So the question of whether the original position described by Rawls implies a theory of person, takes us to a larger debate which opposes liberal and communitarian views on how one should think about an individual's relation to his society. The main questions which arise from this debate are: does Rawls's account of the 'original position' include a theory of the person or of personal identity, that is, does it have any metaphysical claim about self? We should start by examining in detail Rawls account of the 'original position' to understand how an individual in this position is viewed, and see what role the 'original position' plays in Rawls theory.

Extraits

[...] The view of the self embodied in Rawls' account of the original position does not reflect a theory of the person, but a way to understand the citizen within a liberal state. To conclude, we have seen that the self in the original position has some particular features, and that the original position is at the core of the theory of justice. We saw that communitarians consider this view as entailing a theory of person, which is wrong and undermines the theory as a whole. [...]

[...] The first and powerful criticism of Sandel with regard to Rawls' original position concerns the validity of Rawls' view of the individual in the original position. It focuses on the fact that in the original position, the self does not know about its conception of the good. That is, the self ignores its values, while, in Sandel's opinion, these values precisely constitute the self. In fact, in the original position, the individual is required to rationally choose what ends or values are important to him. It implies that there exists a self which is able to make such a choice. [...]

[...] We also see, as a result of the importance of this concept in Rawls' foundation of a theory of justice, that if the original position is successfully questioned by communitarians, it threatens the whole Rawlsian edifice. But, as we have seen, the original position, and its consequences on the conception of the self, is designed to provide a theory of justice. Does it imply that this conception of the self constitutes a theory of the person, that is, one which does not only apply to thinking of a conception of justice? [...]

[...] The main questioning which arises from this debate is following: does Rawls's account of the original position include a theory of the person or of personal identity, that is, does it have any metaphysical claim about the self? We should start by examining in detail Rawls' account of the original position to understand how the individual in this position is viewed, and see what role the original position plays in Rawls' theory. We will then see that the implications of this Rawlsian original position is considered by communitarians as implying a theory of person which greatly differs from the way they consider the individual is constituted. [...]

[...] As the conception of the good is not taken into account in the original position, the state is to be neutral. Sandel claims however that, because of Rawls' theory of the person, the liberal state is unable to ensure every citizen to be able to fulfil himself. According to him, some conceptions of the good are not possible within Rawls' framework. Those conceptions of the good are those which ‘allow for or presuppose constitutive personal attachments to values, projects and communities' By ‘constitutive attachment', it is meant that these values are part of the self's identity, rather than an end which the self decides to pursue. [...]