How can MacIntyre claim that some traditions, but not others, can escape the problem of incommensurability in their moral reasoning?

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From the moment we abandoned Aristotle's teleology, MacIntyre believes, there has been no proper moral philosophy, but only philosophers "working ... with bits and pieces of philosophies which are detached from their original pre-Enlightenment settings in which they were comprehensible and useful." In other words we live in a world where philosophy is in a state of great confusion, whereas it was once rational and unified. So was, MacIntyre believes, the ancient Greek polis which was articulated according to Aristotle's tripartite scheme; ethics (third element) showed human-beings how to live a good life, that is to say how to pass from the state of man-as he-is (first element) to the state of man-as-he-should-be (second element). Such teleology was based on Aristotle's metaphysical assumptions upon the nature of human-beings, so when his metaphysics was discarded, his teleology was similarly put in question. The Enlightenment philosophers definitely rejected this notion of telos when trying to secularize bases for morality.

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[...] Larmore, ibid. Jennifer A. Herdt, ibid. C. Larmore, ibid D. Keating, Ethical Project of Alasdair MacIntyre : a disquieting solution”, www.anselmphilosophy.com C. Larmore, ibid See Emily R. Gill, MacIntyre, Rationality and the Liberal tradition, Polity, Vol No (Spring, 1992), pp. 433-457 See the introductory note of Emily R. Gill's article, ibid. [...]

[...] What is at stake here is to determined how MacIntyre can sincerely claim that some theories can escape the problem of incommensurability, while he accuses all modern theories of failing before such an issue. What distinguishes the ones from the others? Is the distinction that he draws consistent enough? I shall first consider how to escape the problem of incommensurability according to MacIntyre. Secondly I shall argue that such an account might in fact be doomed by self-contradiction. Moreover, MacIntyre's argument falls under the critique that he applies a double standard when it comes to decide between the theory he stands for (Thomism) and modern theories (especially liberalism). [...]

[...] How can MacIntyre claim that some traditions, but not others, can escape the problem of incommensurability in their moral reasoning? From the moment we abandoned Aristotle's teleology, MacIntyre believes, there has been no proper moral philosophy, but only philosophers “working . with bits and pieces of philosophies which are detached from their original pre-Enlightenment settings in which they were comprehensible and useful.”[1] In other words we live in a world where philosophy is in a state of great confusion, whereas it was once rational and unified. [...]

[...] Second Edition. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press (1981) J. A. Herdt, “Alasdair MacIntyre's "Rationality of Traditions" and Tradition-Transcendental Standards of Justification”, The Journal of Religion, Vol No (Oct., 1998), pp. 524- 546. C. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press E. R. Gill, MacIntyre, “Rationality and the Liberal tradition”, Polity, Vol No (Spring, 1992), pp. 433-457 A. Thomas (1998). [...]

[...] Ibid Jennifer A. Herdt, Alasdair MacIntyre's "Rationality of Traditions" and Tradition-Transcendental Standards of Justification, The Journal of Religion, Vol No (Oct., 1998), pp. 524- 546. C. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press MacIntyre quoted in C. Larmore, ibid. [17]This argument is more fully detailed in: Jennifer A. Herdt, ibid, p537. MacIntyre quoted in Jennifer A. Herdt, ibid. C. [...]