Distinction between internalism and externalism about moral motivation : does Smith's argument against externalism work ?

Résumé du document

Internalism and externalism about ethical motivation are two philosophical theories which appeared in the middle of the twentieth century. They are both concerned with the problem of ethical motivation. This implies that they both attempt to explain the way an agent can be motivated to act according to her moral judgment. They have different views on the issue, on which we are going to focus in the first part of this essay. Smith is one of the main philosophers supporting the internalist thesis. In his work "the moral problem?, he explains his theory and compares it with externalism. Different issues are raised in this debate, and different externalist philosophers have tried to answer Smith's work. We are going to focus on this particular debate in the second part of the essay, first by examining Smith's argument, and then by seeing how externalists challenge him. The issue of the debate is fundamental because these two positions have consequences on the way we consider the "nature and status of moral judgment and values?.

Extraits

[...] Lillehammer says that externalism can be consistent with de re concerns. It is commonly agreed that people care for their family, friends, and even for other issues, without the need to refer to the idea of goodness itself. But some of the most relevant critics have been formulated by Miller. The main distinction between internalists and externalists lays in the distinction between derived and underived desire to do something good. But Miller shows that this distinction is obsolete. He takes the example of honesty to illustrate his claim. [...]

[...] First, it is interesting to focus on Brink's argument, as he responds to Smith's argument on amoralism. Contrary to smith, Brink distinguishes two types of amoralists. The first one is the ‘unprincipled amoralist'(2), which Smith concedes. This type of amoralism is due to ‘psychological interferences', so the lack of motivation does not reflect the agent's moral judgment. This type of amoralism is consistent with Smith's claim. However the second one is not. It is ‘principled amoralism', and it proves that it is possible to make ethical judgments and yet remain unmoved. [...]

[...] In a nutshell, the distinction between internalism and externalism is based on their opposite view of the link between moral judgment and moral motivation. This distinction is at the origin of the whole debate which opposes Smith to externalists. Even if Smith's argument seems to be well justified, he fails to challenge externalism, and he even threatens the relevancy of the whole debate between internalism and externalism. However, it cannot be denied that his contribution has helped the debate to go into depth. [...]

[...] Distinction between internalism and externalism about moral motivation : does Smith's argument against externalism work ? Internalism and externalism about ethical motivation are two philosophical theories which appeared in the middle of the twentieth century. They are both concerned with the problem of ethical motivation, i.e. they both attempt to explain the way an agent can be motivated to act according to her moral judgement. They have a different view on this issue, on which we are going to focus in the first part of this essay. [...]

[...] And this challenges the heart of Smith argument: the practicality requirement. Secondly, it is important to deal with Hallvard Lillehammer's critics. Smith considers that a de re motivation is a more moral way of acting; because it comes from underivative desires, there is no need to refer to the idea of goodness itself. Lillehammer thinks this is erroneous. First, he takes the example of a woman who is tempted to cheat on her husband. - M. Smith (1994) The Moral Problem ch.3 - David Brink (1997) “Moral motivation”, Ethics, pp. [...]