The distinction between internalism and externalism about moral motivation. Does Smith's argument against externalism work?

Résumé du document

Moral motivation and the way it functions have raised many theories, still debated today. There are two main theories under discussion; internalism and externalism about ethical motivation, both of them being central in the explanation of the mechanism that lies between moral judgements of an agent and his or her motivation to act upon and according to these judgements. These two theories define the nature of the link between judgement and motivation differently. According to the internalists, the connection between moral judgement and motivation for the "good and strong-willed person" is internal, it "follows directly from the content of moral judgement itself", whereas for the externalists, the link is external and "follows from the content of the motivational dispositions possessed [by the person]" (Michael Smith The Moral Problem (1994) III, 3.5). The core opposition between these theories has led to severe criticism between the supporters of both streams. What distinctions can be made between internalism and externalism about moral motivation? Michael Smith in The Moral Problem presents the internalist view of moral motivation as the only plausible theory and challenges the externalist theory. Does his argument against externalism work?

Extraits

[...] The distinction between internalism and externalism about moral motivation. Does Smith's argument against externalism work? Moral motivation and the way it functions have raised many theories, still debated today. There are two main theories under discussion; internalism and externalism about ethical motivation, both of them being central in the explanation of the mechanism that lies between moral judgements of an agent and his or her motivation to act upon and according to these judgements. These two theories define the nature of the link between judgement and motivation differently. [...]

[...] As a matter of a fact, it is commonly observed that an agent will see his or her moral motivation change if his or her ethical judgement changes. To account for this fact, Smith chooses the example of a man convinced that voting for the libertarian party is the right thing to do, and hence motivated accordingly to vote for that party at the general elections. He discusses his political opinion with a friend. This friend manages to convince him that voting for the social democrats and not for the libertarians is the right thing to do, and therefore makes him change his fundamental values. [...]

[...] Smith deems this externalist desire concerning the good de dicto as “fetishism”. The agent that aims at doing the right thing when it is read de dicto cannot be considered as good and valuable, as all his desires are derivative desires and hence this agent cannot be considered as a morally good person. A person that intends to do the good de dicto is alienated by his or her ends, whatever morally respectable his or her actions are, as the only goal aimed at is to do what this person judges to be the right in itself, which is empty commitment. [...]

[...] In the motivated desire theory, the belief alone originates both the desire and the motivation. The core oppositions of internalism and externalism have generated much literature, supporters of each theories responding to each other by examples and counter-examples. One very well known externalist counter- argument to the internalist position on moral motivation is David Brink's example of the amoralist. According to Brink in Externalist Moral Realism (1986), the existence of amoralists invalidates the internalist theory. Amoralist is someone who recognizes the existence of moral considerations and remains unmoved” (D. Brink, op. cit. page 30). [...]

[...] First, I will describe internalism and externalism about moral motivation and the tension that lies between these theories, and then I will expose Smith's argument against externalism and see if this argument is relevant. In contemporary moral philosophy, internalism is the view that moral beliefs function as a motivating factor. That is the internalist believes that there is an internal connection between his or her belief that ought to be done" and his or her motivation to do X. Internalists think that there is a necessary connection between judging something to be good, and being motivated to act in accordance with that moral judgement. [...]