Aristotle and the virtue (Nicomachean Ethics, 1105b19-1107a25)

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This text is extracted from the beginning of two of the famous Aristotle's book, the Nicomachean Ethics (NE). After having done with the problem of the Good and the purpose of the human in Book one (book I, chapters 1-12), Aristotle aims to define what virtue is (I, 13; II). He has already defined virtue as something chosen "for its own sake" but also for "the sake of happiness" (NE, 1097 b 3-6). Since he had put forth the thought that "happiness" (eudaimonia) is the highest good (NE, 1097 b 22), since it is a virtuous activity, virtue should be considered in the second book (NE, 1103 a 5-6). Further, Aristotle distinguishes two parts of the soul which partake of reason: thought and desire. Virtue should therefore be discussed with respect of each one of them. Ethical (moral) virtue is then concerned with desire while the intellectual one is concerned with thought (NE, I, 13). In our extract, we will deal with the first one of these concepts (1106 b 15).

Extraits

[...] We can remember from these differences the practical aspect of the Nature of virtue, by opposition with something which would be ‘potential'. Even if it is not really what we are talking about, we can notice here how the modern difference that we often do between and is artificial since EN shows this similarity of the two terms. This translation by reason in this definition is subject to many controversies footnote p. 116). But it is here the occasion for us to show how this virtue must be an absolute, the excellence of the wised man (ibid). [...]

[...] Furthermore, it is a particular mean that Aristotle wants to reach. Indeed, he specifies that it is mean relative to (NE a 37) that we are considering. We choose the mean with respect to the thing itself but the one in relation to the given person” (NE b 8-9). That means that virtue must be between two vices, and further a sort of mean of these two extremes. We find here again the idea of prudence VI, 12) such important for Aristotle. [...]

[...] For instance, first bring along the powers and later exhibit the corresponding activities”, that means that first learn by performing” (NE a 26-35). So, since the nature of virtue is a habit, and that this habit must be practical, Aristotle try to both conserves the habit and to find the way between excess and deficiency. There is then only one solution if we want to be virtuous, the “moderation” (NE b 18). The Greek philosopher uses for that a kind of syllogism. [...]

[...] However, we will try here to show how the theory of virtue of Aristotle, and especially the ethics virtue presented in this text, can be more than that and be relevant today. In this purpose, we propose to study first this last as an equilibrium, then as an excellence and so an extreme, before trying to show that it is more than that, a complete theory of modern philosophy. Virtue as an equilibrium We will try here to see first how Aristotle describes virtue as a practical process to propose a theory of the moderation. Aristotle starts with the question of what is the Nature of virtue. [...]

[...] And for us, it is the base of Aristotle's ethical virtue. Bibliography Arendt Hannah, "Truth and Politics", in: Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought, New York: Penguin Aristotle, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics translation by Hippocrates G. Apostle, The Peripatetic Press Aristotle, Ethique à Nicomaque, translation by Richard Bodeüs, Flammarion Barthoux Gérard, Pour une morale de l'Homme concret http://www.itereva.pf/disciplines/philo/Enseignement%20de%20la%20philosophie /Bulletins/Bulletin4/Aristote/Aristote%201.htm#_ftn4, 2006-12-07 Natali La phrônesis d'Aristote dans la dernière décennie du XXème siècle in L'Excellence de la vie Rawls John, A theory of social Justice, Harvard University Press We use it two versions of the book, and therefore two translations, which can be important: Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics translation by Hippocrates G. [...]