Aristotle and the best kind of life in society

Résumé du document

Nicomachean Ethics (NE) is generally considered, not without any reason, as one of the main books in the history of the ethics. Indeed, Aristotle describes and constructs in his book major concepts, like virtue or happiness that have been used for a long time, from Kant to Arendt and that do not lose their modernity, judging by the number of commentaries about this book. However, many imprecision's remain, especially around the question of the good life. As A. MacC. Armstrong (1958) picks out, the notion of Good and Goodness can be confusing and lead to some interrogations or mistakes. Moreover, different interpretations of the best kind of life can seem to be in opposition. Thus, some see in the Greek philosopher's thought two inconsistent teachings (Clark, 1975) when others see only one (Cooper, 1975). In other words, the debate shows a tension between the Book I and the Book X of NE, which allows two visions of the good life; the second one excluding "any concern for familial, social or political life, except insofar as they provide the conditions for a life of theoretical activity" (Tessitore, 1992, p.199).

Extraits

[...] However, it shows the importance for Aristotle to consider the not as the middle between two bad positions, a kind of consensus of the mediocrity, but really as an “excellence”. He says himself that is an extreme” (1107a7) since there is a “highest good” (ibid), according to this scale, mean is in a certain way an extreme” (1107 a 23). Besides, Aristotle adopts the same reasoning for intellectual virtues with the “right reason” (1138 b which shows the importance of the notion of excellence for the philosopher in the search for the highest good. [...]

[...] Above all, Aristotle defines the purpose of the human being as an excellence. He first starts with the famous arguments of the function (ergon) of the human. Each thing or activity, has a function, an ergon (1097b25-35). The function has two characteristics, it must be chosen for itself, and be self-sufficient (1098a). Consequently, we must leave the “life of nutrition and of growth” shared with plants and animals. So, the function of humans is to use reason, our rational life of the soul. [...]

[...] But it is here the occasion for us to show how this virtue must be an absolute, the excellence of the wised man (ibid). It is interesting to not note on this word a difference of translation since in EN (2004, p.111) it would be more a ‘state' only, without specifying which one. We can remember from these differences the practical aspect of the Nature of virtue, by opposition with something which would be ‘potential'. We will accept here the term in the wide sense; education is the process of learning from Aristotle's point of view. [...]

[...] The best kind of life will consequently take place in this tension. Thus, on the way to the divine, Aristotle contemplates the beauty of the forms at the last step of the life of a philosopher, but once this homage is paid, he comes back to reality, since we are humans. The good life is above all a question of practice, for an existence engaged in the sensations. And since Aristotle refuses simplify the question of the best way of life” (Tessidore p.214), we should discover in his thought a synthesis. [...]

[...] Aristide Tessitore, “Aristotle's Ambiguous Account of the Best Polity, Vol No (Winter, 1992), pp. 197-215. Aristide Tessitore, “Making the City Safe For Philosophy: Nicomachean Ethics, Book The American Political Science Review, Vol No (Dec., 1990), pp. 1251-1262. We use it two versions of the book, and therefore two translations, which can be important: Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics translation by Hippocrates G. Apostle, The Peripatetic Press and the French translation, Ethique à Nicomaque, translation by Richard Bodeüs, Flammarion For instance, the division of the chapters is not the same, we will adopt here the generic one from F.Susemihl's edition. [...]