What strengths and weaknesses of the Royal Navy were revealed in the Falklands War?

Résumé du document

The issue between Argentina and the United Kingdom concerning Falkland's islands is as old as the creation of Argentina itself. However it is more in the second half of the twentieth century that Falkland Islands emerged as the main issue between both countries. Both countries have got their own version of the islands' history to legitimize their views. The geographical point of view favors the claim of Argentina, as the islands are four hundred miles from the Argentine coast but eight thousand miles from Britain. At that time during the Cold War, both countries were major allies for the United States of America. Argentina provided support in South America, and Britain on the Northern Europe front while bringing into the fold a global power like France. Both of them were even linked militarily to the USA; the NATO for the United Kingdom and the OAS with the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance for Argentina. However, the war could be explained more effectively thanks to the domestic context in each country. Thus Argentina was an authoritarian regime ruled by a military junta with President Leopoldo Galtieri ad its head since December 1981, and the economic and healthcare situations of the country were in a disastrous condition.

Extraits

[...] Night attacks showed an outstanding performance of the Harrier and helicopter pilots. Most of aircraft deployed was from the Royal Navy. Pilots were well trained and used to do large scale exercises within the NATO. Another thing which is often undermined is the French help concerning the training of the Task Force. As an EEC partner France with other EEC countries with the United States declared an embargo on military armament toward Argentina. But my point is that when the Task Force was on large of French coasts (large of Brest actually), French pilots simulated attacks on the Task Force with their Mirage III and Super Etendards, the same aircrafts which equipped Argentine forces. [...]

[...] Indeed even France which had the second biggest navy in Europe with two medium aircraft carriers (the Foch and the Clemenceau) could not have afforded such a situation. The conflict showed the importance to have a balanced flexible maritime forces or fleet[1]. More over as it is underline in a report operations of the Task Force at sea were guided by three established principles of Maritime Power: containment of enemy forces, defence in depth and keeping the initiative”[2]. Respecting these principles was quite harsh for the Royal Navy but she managed to do so. [...]

[...] The excellence of the Royal Navy's technicians allowed high rate of availability for materiel. The weather, before the war was an issue for several analysts. However it seems that it is more Argentineans who suffered from the weather than British. The use of this particular type of weather conditions thanks to trainings in Norway (on northern NATO's flank) was a key factor in the battle, and so the experience to manage amphibious operations proved to be vital. British soldiers being professional were a key factor in the success. [...]

[...] The Royal Navy faced the challenge purposed by the British Prime Minister and demonstrates its capacity to send an enormous fleet of over one hundred ships in the South Atlantic miles away from the motherland. In the country the debate between continentalists and maritimists has been closed. And Britain decided to take more care of its fleet, refusing to sell anymore its jewellery like Aircraft carriers . Bibliography - Major-General Julian Thompson, 'Force Projection and the Falklands Conflict' in Stephen Badsey, Rob Havers, Mark Grove (Eds.), The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years On: Lessons for the Future, (London: Frank Cass, 2005), pp. 91-98. [...]

[...] Grove, 'Falklands Conflict 1982 - The Air War: A New Appraisal' in Stephen Badsey, Rob Havers, Mark Grove (Eds.), The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years On: Lessons for the Future, (London: Frank Cass, 2005), pp. 265-282. - Charles W. Koburger, Jr , Sea power in the Falklands, (New York: Praeger, 1983) - Jean Labayle Couhat, Combat fleets of the world 1984/85, English translation by A.D. Baker III, (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1984). - The Falklands campaign: the lessons, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for defence by Command of her Majesty (London, December 1982) - Lessons of the Falklands, Summary report, (Washington: Department of the Navy, February 1983) - Adrian English & Anthony Watts, Battle for the Falklands Naval forces, in Men-at-arms 134, (Oxford: Osprey, 1982) - Peter M. [...]