In 1965, the European Union faces one of its most important crises, known as the 'empty chair crisis'. The French president, General Charles de Gaulle, decides to withdraw his Foreign Affair minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, from any meeting at the Council of Ministers because of his disagreement on the development of the Union. At after six months of high conflict, an agreement is reached in Luxembourg in January 1966. The other member states submit to the French view in order to solve the problem
[...] Not only France but also her partner uses this compromise in order to adopt the majority-voting rule as the normal deliberation process. From 1966, except for unimportant issues, and contrary to literal interpretation of the text, all the deliberations of the Council are taken at the unanimity. Actually, they are no vote within the Council. Foreign ministers discuss until they all agree on a common position, or at least, until no one refuses the compromise. The major drawback of the practise is the immobility that it involves. [...]
[...] Thus, for reasons due to principles and conjuncture, de Gaulle opposes the reform. At the end of the French presidency of the Council of Ministers, January 30th 1965, Maurice Couve de Murville, Foreign Affairs minister, says: "The promises have not been kept, I adjourn the meeting." It is the beginning of the "empty chair crisis", which opposes France to her five European partners and the European Commission. During more than six months, France boycotts the European community. The Luxembourg Compromise of January 29th 1966 ends the important institutional crisis of the EEC. [...]
[...] Garett and Tsebelis have noticed three domains where the Luxembourg Compromise decision-making process applies. First, the member governments in the Council of Ministers are solely responsible for revising the European Union's treaties for its external relationships, and for the new areas added to European Union jurisdiction in the Maastricht treaty. Second, some policies are decided unanimously after the Commission proposal, such as indirect taxation, exchange rate parities for Economic and Monetary Union, industrial policy, energy policy The possibility offered to the Council to amend unanimously the Commission proposals, the outcomes are likely to be similar to those generated by the Luxembourg compromise. [...]
[...] The financing modalities of the CAP are divided in two periods. For a first era, prior to the completion of the customs union, the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) disposes of two types of resources: first, it disposes of taxes on the agricultural importations between the state members, second of the contributions of the state members or agricultural payments, which are meant to be revised before June 30th Then, after the unification of the tariffs, the EAGGF is meant to be only financed by taxes on the agricultural and industrial importations from member states, the common external tariff (CET) collected by national customs officials at their point of entry into the EEC, and then handed over to Brussels, after a deduction of 10 per cent as a service charge. [...]
[...] Then, we will explore the consequences of the crisis. The Luxembourg Compromise is said to be an important deviation from the original ideas contain in the Rome Treaties. It mainly allows the member states to use veto on any question that they think to oppose to their national interests within the Council of Ministers. It is one of the major reasons for what has been called the 'eurosclerosis' of the 1970s. In 1965, France conflicts with the European Commission, presided by Walter Hallstein (1958-1967). [...]
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