The United States in World War II: a difficult position towards France. The shaping of modern American diplomacy

Résumé du document

"Until 1945, US foreign policy makers sought to fashion the United States, into a great power, as an equal to the major European nations? . From the Spanish war up to the beginning of World War II, the Americans have been trying to catch up with the traditional European powers. But a sense of moral superiority as well as some lack of international experience kept the United States from fully competing with the old powers. Woodrow Wilson's exceptionalism and the neutrality laws illustrate America's shy commitment to carry on a full foreign diplomacy which would compete with Europe's past hegemony. The American diplomacy stuck all that time to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 which had the US diplomacy essentially focused on the American continent .

Extraits

[...] I The American interest over North Africa Like its Allies, Britain and the Soviet Union, the United States were looking for means to boost their own leadership over the postwar world and to improve its political influence over the fate and the reconstruction of postwar Europe. While the Department of State, the armed forces and the Treasury were designing plans and postwar policies, Roosevelt exercised personal leadership over US foreign diplomacy. A step towards such a goal was reached with the invasion of Northern Africa from November 8th 1942 by the American Army[5]. [...]

[...] Therefore, no French group could be granted any formal authority over Free France and North Africa. America would keep civil control under the strict monitoring of the occupying US forces and General Eisenhower[21], preventing any attempt by the French to claim such sovereignty. Indeed, Roosevelt regarded President Lebrun as the only depositary of French sovereignty and on this ground rejected both General Giraud's claim to have been chosen by a French Imperial Council which the US did not recognize and the possibility for de Gaulle to be given authority regarding the sovereignty of France. [...]

[...] Very much like his predecessor Woodrow Wilson, he organized US diplomacy himself, especially on the matter of North Africa. The President appointed Robert Daniel Murphy as his chief adviser on North African affairs who had to deal both with the political situation in the freed territories of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, as well as with the organization of a free French Army from North Africa. Before his departure for the European scene, Murphy received two direct orders in 1941 from the President[6]. [...]

[...] It proved to be an efficient base from which the US Army opened a Second front. - A matter of balance among the Anglo Saxon Allies. On the European scene, the British were the only ones to have some physical presence until 1942. From November 1942, by controlling Northern African territories and demonstrating its military value, the USA influenced the military strategies and political talks over the fate of liberated Europe. In establishing some sort of direct political influence with its representative Eisenhower, who was in full power over North Africa, the USA balanced the British power over the European Continent. [...]

[...] Our interest lies mainly in the related third and fourth points as we are going to focus on the French question as a point of divergence between American and British powers over the course of WWII. II American clashing interest with Britain The US President's personal representative in Northern Africa, Murphy, organized the administration of Northern African affairs according to Roosevelt's concerns. He sat up a network of US vice-consuls over North Africa and maintained relations with anti-De Gaulle or Vichyste French personalities (General Weygand, Lemaigre-Dubreuil, Admiral Darlan, Giraud), ignoring the rising organized resistance movement in France and in the French colonies. [...]