evaluate the changing historical debate surrounding Neville chamberlain and the policy of appeasement

Résumé du document

In order to answer the question surrounding Neville chamberlain and his appeasement policy three different historical perspectives need to be focused on and they are
the orthodox view - (1940's view, strengths and weaknesses)
the revisionists view (1960's, strengths and weaknesses)
the post revisionists view (1990's, strengths and weaknesses)
this plan also takes into account what is appeasement and how the definition changed prior to WW2. the reader can also find a small bibliography attached.

Extraits

[...] Mommsen, W. and Kettenacker, L. (1983). The Fascist challenge and the policy of appeasement. London: Allen & Unwin. Parker, R. (2001). Chamberlain and appeasement British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War. Basingstoke [u.a. Jstor.org. (2017). [...]

[...] ' ' (Page 84 Hitler Chamberlain and Appeasement Frank McDonough). (For Example; With reference to the liquidation of the Czech runp State the Fuhrer has given the following orders - The case is prepared on the assumption no resistance will be offered. It must be presented that the invasion is a peaceful action" Keith Middlemass argues that appeasement was based on an illusion that Hitler's aims were limited to the Treaty of Versailles. (page 6 Neville Chamberlin, appeasement and the British road to war Frank McDonough) For Example; The role of intelligence documents which suggest the Hitler's goals were not limited to reviving Versailles but to dominate Europe. [...]

[...] Point; The idea that Chamberlin hoped for the best and prepared for the worst. This shown in using appeasement to supress Hitler and focus on expanding the British army, navy, air force etc. in order to protect themselves if the worst should happen due to Chamberlin being aware of Hitler's character this shown in his diaries. `We cannot accept this as reliable estimate of a mad dictator's reaction.' (N. Chamberlin's diary March 1936)`if calamity is imminent it must be bought to make Britain secure.' (David dilks, `We must hope for best and prepare for the worst': The Prime Minister, the Cabinet and Hitler's Germany, 1937-1938', page 316)Chamberlin was prepared to send a battle fleet to the Far East if a major Japanese threat was imminent this was discussed as late as the imperial conference of May 1937. [...]

[...] Review on JSTOR. [online] Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/556152.pdf [Accessed 6 Dec. 2017].]: Palgrave. [...]

[...] They viewed Chamberlin as deceptive, incompetent leader, poor military planning. For example, Chamberlin was aware that appeasement could only work in the long run but did not make this awareness known to the British public- `newspapers across the world gave credit to the British Government to Hitler's fury.' (David dilks, `We must hope for best and prepare for the worst': The Prime Minister, the Cabinet and Hitler's Germany, 1937-1938', page 327-328) Criticism of Contemporary Historians - Lack of Primary Sources to back up orthodox opinion of appeasement/ Instant Judgement; both Chamberlin's and cabinet papers not released. [...]