The failure of Woodrow Wilson to win the consent of the Senate for ratification of the Treaty of Versailles

Résumé du document

The Treaty of Versailles put a final conclusion to the World War I in June 1919, but the consequences of this 6-month bitter negotiation between the "Big Three" had the greatest influence on the course of the following twenty years. The Armistice signed on November 11th, 1918 had formerly ended the actual fighting, but the victors of the bloodiest war of history were strongly determined to impose their conditions on the peace terms. The democrat President had already exposed his famous fourteen points to the Congress in 1917 and it was decided to take advantage of his popularity to establish self-determination, free-trade, and to create a League of Nations. Unfortunately, Wilson's idealism faced the harsh reality of negotiations with England and France. Not only was it difficult for Woodrow Wilson to implement his fourteen points, but it was also a challenge for him to convince the American people that the path he was building was the right one to follow. Despite incredible efforts to rally to his cause the senators and the public opinion, the Treaty of Versailles was rejected by the American Senate. Consequently, any hope of building an extravert foreign policy was swept away.

Extraits

[...] Far from isolationists, these leaders refused to endorse the role of the powerful Nation that would regulate and solve conflicts around the world, even under the mandate of the League. The fear of Bolshevism and an increasing fear of being in contact with the “poison-infected areas of the world”[14] through interventions under the mandate of the League of Nations added up to the argumentation of opponents to the Wilsonian project. Indeed the fear of Bolshevism had already spread to the U.S. and the country was scared by the Scare”. [...]

[...] Wilson's first set back was embodied by the allies' rejection of a “peace without victory”. The French and Great Britain wanted nothing but a vengeance and a complete defeat of Germany. Some powerful politicians in the U.S., like Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt, approved of such a view and pleaded in favour of a total Allied victory. Wilson fought such view but it was already a hint that his mix of idealism and realism was being challenged in his own country. [...]

[...] However, it was again voted down on March with a shorter advance, but sufficient to burry the Treaty of Versailles. Wilson's political and tactical blunders during the negotiation in Versailles had already emptied the treaty from the 14 points substance and scepticism was growing at home while Wilson was struggling. The cruel political determination of victors to cripple the vanquished and the Bolshevik threat added to the confusion in the U.S. But most of all, it seems that the political impregnation of the Monroe Doctrine on the American Elite and the fear to intervene abroad to solve conflicts convinced the Senate to vote down the treaty. [...]

[...] Two major groups of opponents struggled against Wilson in order to reject the Treaty of Versailles in the Senate. The Irreconcilables led by Senators William Borah and Hiram Johnson opposed any kind of American membership in any sort of organization such as the League of Nations. They not want to withdraw from the world but were opposed to American boys policing Europe” as explained Johnson[11]. Along with these fierce republicans the reservationists, led by Henry Cabot Lodge also opposed to the ratification of the treaty. [...]

[...] Wilson's failure to present to the Senate a convincing peace treaty was due to a misconception of the geopolitical situation in Europe, but also in Russia. The country had fallen into the hands of the Bolsheviks and was facing a terrible civil war. The Fourteen points which he had confided to House were “shaped to answer Lenin's demands for revolution and an end to the war without territorial annexations on either side. Wilson was trapped between European conservatives who wanted to restore the pre-war world order without Germany, and the Bolsheviks who had the ambition to create a “classless world”, no matter the cost”[3]. [...]