Constantinople: the Key to European Balance in the pre First World War World

Résumé du document

One can view the First World War and claim that it was fought for a complex web of rationales by a complex web of interdependent actors and the events of June 1914 sent the whole system into a state of madness and disarray. However, one can also claim that Europe was systematically into two warring camps, the Allies and the Central Powers, and that the events of the past century had attempted to stabilize this dual-sided equilibrium with the advent of colonial expansionism and the creation of a widespread alliance system. While the Great European Powers fought to advance their empires and interests, there was one empire to the East that was fighting to stay alive. As the Ottoman's declined, the European powers looked to take advantage of their vulnerabilities and for seventy years Constantinople became the target on every European ruler's list. The capital of Anatolia played a crucial role in the Great War for the mere fact that it maintained a vital geographic position and because of its universal appeal, its safety served as a check on each of the growing Great Powers. Constantinople simultaneously held together and tore apart Russia, France, and Britain.

Extraits

[...] The Allied defeat at Gallipoli demonstrated two important things: Russia could not safely connect itself to Western Europe, militarily or commercially, without control of the Ottoman territories, and Britain was willing to risk tens of thousands of lives in the Middle East in exchange for a solid foothold in their colonial backyard. Constantinople was the key that unlocked all doors between the east and west, that is to say military doors, commercial doors, and as is evident today, cultural doors as well. Despite the failure at Gallipoli, France and Britain readied themselves for the collapse of the Ottoman Empire with the secret Sykes- Picot Agreement made in May that essentially pre-defined which territories the two powers would claim following the war. [...]

[...] Meanwhile, Britain was further pursuing its Middle East interests by way of North Africa. The construction of the Suez Canal in Egypt, which connects the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea, was an obvious geostrategic treasure; the canal effectively cut the distance of a steamship's route from London to Bombay in half by bypassing the Cape of Good Hope located at the southern tip of Africa. As a direct result of the canal, the number of ships passing through under British management rose from 486 in 1870 to 3,000 in 1882 (906, Merriman). [...]

[...] Smith. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 6th Edition. Bedford / St. Martin's: New York City Behind the Invasion of Iraq, Research Unit for Political Economy. Monthly Review Press: New York Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau & Annette Becker. 14-18, Understanding the Great War. Hill and Wang : New York Jean-Jacques Becker, Jay M. Winter, Gerd Krumeich, Annette Becker, Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau. [...]

[...] Constantinople figured itself into Europe much like the fulcrum of a scale, and whoever controlled it would be able to tip enough power in their direction to be able to menace the powers around it. Russia wanted naval access to the Mediterranean and routes to the Balkans, Britain wanted routes to the East Indies and protection of its commercial interests, France and Germany wanted to ensure that the first two powers didn't became too strong so as to dominate the European continent. [...]

[...] However, Britain feared that if left unchecked, the German land troops would probably be able to march into the Middle East faster than a British naval fleet could get there. This worry was of course compounded during the war by the fact that the Ottoman Empire was allied with the Central Powers, posing direct obstructions to trade routes that were crucial to British colonial interests. Thus, although in signing the Entente alliance, Britain certainly had proximate concerns about a German army that planned to cozy up along the English Channel, they also had more remote concerns that could only be addressed by finding strong European partners to maintain the balance of power. [...]