Anglo-American relations - The close relationship (1964-1979)

Résumé du document

With the benefit of hindsight, a lot of scholars saw (and still see) Anglo-American relations between 1964 and 1979 in a negative light. One scholar (J.W Young, Cold War Europe 1945-1991, 1996) speaks of "the lean years of the almost forgotten friendship". Some go as far so to say this was a period in which there was no SR (for special relationship) between London and Washington, mainly because of Heath's pro-European stance (John Dickie, Special No More, 1994). What I'd like to do today is to try and cast a more favourable light on the SR and to show that the idea of an opposition between Britain's pro-American and pro-European are fundamentally warped. No structural opposition, no institutional incompatibility. More a question of perception, not to say of political passions.

Extraits

[...] Kissinger then complained to Sir Alec Douglas-Home (Foreign Secretary 1970-1974. Note that he was constantly trying to avoid any loosening of the transatlantic tie) that America's NATO allies (except for a few exceptions) “the Soviet Union had been freer to use NATO airspace than the US”. Remember that days after the start of the war, came a nuclear alert. The British were informed, but NOT consulted. This may explain why it was then considered by a unilateralist reaction on the part of the Americans. [...]

[...] Not the mention the obvious fact that any speculation against sterling could have some disastrous knock-on effects on the dollar. Some figures Johnson administration arranged billion credits, of which American share billion The Americans helped the British secure a further $ 900 million in credits from American and central European central banks Sterling crisis. January 1976, sterling stood at roughly $2. Late September $ 1.6 Frightening performance. Multiple causes Balance-of-payments deficit High internal rate of inflation Government's inability to contain the Public Sector Borrowing requirement From a US point of view, this sterling crisis, which gradually faded away, was seen as the symptom of a British disease. [...]

[...] But, in practice, he did very little about this. Quite the contrary, he remained anxious for Britain to remain under the American nuclear umbrella. It was even his Labour successor, James Callaghan, who prepared for the replacement of Polaris by the American Trident missile. You also need to think in terms of institutional cooperation. An everyday working relationship persisted between the British and the US military establishments. To be as concrete as possible: the British Ministry of Defence maintained, in the mid-1970s staff officers in Washington (only 7 in Bonn and 10 in Paris). [...]

[...] He did not want Britain to be refused entry a third time. Remember that CD's veto of 1963 had been motivated by the feeling that GB would be America's Trojan Horse in Europe. Not that Britain was America's Trojan Horse. But that's the way it was perceived by its European allies. As often in history, perception is more important than reality. So Heath basically discouraged the American connection. As PM he did not visit even visit the country until he had been in office for six months. [...]

[...] A close relationship I am never quite sure what it means. I am more interested in a close relationship based on a common purpose, common objectives, and as far as can be achieved in a community of policy, a relationship based not on condescension or on a backward-looking nostalgia for the past, but on the ability of both parties to put forward their strength and their own unique contribution to our common purpose. Charles Lamb (author of the Tales from Shakespeare 1807) said in one of his essays: “There is nothing so irrelevant as a poor relation,” and if ever our relationship with you were based on that status, the sooner it were ended the better: that is why the first priority in British internal policy is to build up our economic strength so that as partners - in the alliance, in Europe, and the Commonwealth - were are relevant and necessary. [...]