Neither a merger nor an acquisition : the Renault-Nissan alliance

Résumé du document

After closing up the 1998 exercise, Renault's profits increased by 68%. Its chairman, L. Schweitzer, is now looking for a partner to become a global player, and then initiate negotiation with Nissan. A. Maher, from Oxford Automotive Services, contended, "It's a fast-track route to become a global player". Indeed the combination would create the fourth-largest automaker. Strategic choice or single alternative: Schweitzer is aware of the risks of failures and the need for an efficient structure and management. That will be the responsibility of C. Ghosn management, multicultural and "multi-corporate" successful leader in the auto industry (Michelin, Renault, Nissan) known for cost killing profitability-oriented restructuration, successfully implemented through a specific management. The purpose of this report is to analyze the specificity of the Renault-Nissan Strategic alliance with a particular attention to HRM approaches and the practice of the organizational and strategic integration. Therefore, the analysis, supported by academies researches, will focus on two striking issues from this unique case: The organizational challenge of the specific "hybrid? form of alliance, and the organizational and national cultural challenge in the integration process of a multinational hybrid entity.

Extraits

[...] However, the industry is experimenting consolidation moves and competes globally. The challenge of the project would be to get closer through complementarities and leveraging differences. IHRM will be the managerial tool smoothing and stimulating the strategic integration process References Barel, Y (2006) Fusions-Acquisitions internationales : Le choc des cultures La revue des Sciences de Gestion, Direction et Gestion n°218 Stratégie. March-Apr Barmeyer Ch. et Mayrhofer U. (2002), Le management interculturel : facteur de réussite des fusions-acquisitions internationales ? Gérer et Comprendre, 70, p. 24-33. [...]

[...] Managerially speaking, his method is holistic with a systemic approach of the environment and the organisational context. Thereby, he considered the global logic emerging from interaction and interconnections. For instance, when he first came to Nissan, he was wondering how to be accepted since he was an outsider (Non Japanese and non Nissan that will radically change the organisational culture and practices. To address the two potentially conflicting goals of making change while safeguarding identity, he knew that imposing change will face resistance but being passive will not stop the downward spiral. [...]

[...] The structural rational on which Renault-Nissan relies is very specific. Indeed, four distinctive features needs to be highlighted: A strategic management committee (SMC) The integrity of respective original structure, and their coexistence Numerous and various relationships between the SMC and the two original entity Transversal teams that cooperates under diverse forms and degree of intensity. Hence, the decision taking process and responsibility is shared rather than being unique Moreover, the resolution of internal conflict is not managed through hierarchy and formal process, nor through mutual confidence; but refers to an of faith”, meaning the recognition of the fragility as a mean to foster cooperation and mutualisation of strengths. [...]

[...] The organisational change raises two complementary cultural challenges. The nature of the strategic integration's barriers In M&A operation the three main cultural barriers commonly acknowledged are: The feeling of organisational injustice, as procedural as distributive (Monin et al. 2005). This is particularly true in the pretending “merger of equal” where the equal balance is supposed stimulate efficiency and social cohesiveness (e.g. Daimler-Benz &Chrysler failure). The feeling of status' relative variation The acculturation difficulties In a pure strategic alliance organisation, barriers take the form of organisational “coopetitions” (Hamel and Doz, 2002). [...]

[...] Neither a merger nor an acquisition : the Renault-Nissan alliance Introduction Closing up the 1998 exercise, Renault profits increased by 68%. Its chairman, L. Schweitzer, is now looking for a partner to become a global player, and then initiate negotiation with Nissan. A. Maher, from Oxford Automotive Services, contended, "It's a fast-track route to become a global player"[1]. Indeed the combination would create the fourth-largest automaker. Strategic choice or single alternative? First attempts from Renault toward Asian car manufacturers failed; while Nissan would have loved to merge a U.S. [...]